An important question in ethics is, are there any universal and absolute 'oughts' shared by all human beings? In case there are such oughts, how can such universal oughts be explained on the basis that every ought' is directed towards some goal? Incidentally, we reach some fine conclusions at this point.
Concerning the difference between theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom it is not sufficient to say that the formers deals with is' and the latter with ought.' This is not a sufficient explanation for practical wisdom. After all practical wisdom is wisdom and wisdom deals with universal issues. Hence practical wisdom should be defined as dealing with universal 'oughts,' otherwise there are also certain 'oughts' in geometry, industry etc., but they have nothing to do with practical wisdom. What is to be noted here is that there are universal 'oughts' which are familiar to every mind. Therefore, such 'oughts' must be directed towards goals which are not particular and individual. If we could prove such 'oughts,' we will have to accept that they are rooted in the soul and that man is not confined to physical nature only. This will be one of the proofs of the immaterial nature of soul.
Kant also reached the immortality of the soul through moral issues, Man's physical nature has some needs which are limited and relative. The needs of one person differ from those of another person. The 'oughts' for meeting such needs are also different and often contradict one another. There are many 'oughts' which are opposed to other ougths' and so such 'oughts' are not of an ethical nature. But man, by virtue of his soul, enjoys a station which - like man's physical nature, to which his outward will and thought are subject - draws him towards its own goals. Man's physical nature draws him towards its goals in order to attain its own perfection. It needs food, and we say we ought to eat food. According to Schopenhauer, we are made to feel pleasure and to be on look out for pleasure in the world of ideas, while we are unaware of the fact that within our inner being it is nature which seeks to achieve its ends. It is nature that moves towards its end, but it provides pleasure for us in order to make us serve its own purposes. While in the world of ideas we are drawn towards pleasure, in reality we move to fulfill the goals of nature. For example, when the baby cries, it is nature which seeks to bring him up. When the baby cries due to the feeling of pain, it is nature which declares its need, having subjected the baby's feeling and mind.
Man enjoys a certain spiritual perfection and sublimity which is rooted in his God-given nobility and dignity (some 'oughts' are meant to achieve that spiritual perfection). When someone says, I ought to do such and such a thing,' it means I must attain to that excellence,' although such a goal may not be reflected in his outer consciousness. Those excellence are common to all men, and, therefore, in this respect all men feel the same kind of imperative.
The second justification for universal imperatives is the issue of social spirit. It is said that man is a social creature and he has certain oughts, to meet not his individual but his social needs. In the same way that man is impelled to seek the satisfaction of his individual needs he is impelled to seek the satisfaction of his social needs. Had there been no relations between man and his fellow men, such oughts would not have arisen. For instance, if I had no relations with anyone I would not make any efforts to feed other people. Such imperatives are related to a higher self, be it an individual higher self or a higher social self. That higher self seeks to achieve its goals. That self causes man to perform moral acts. Those acts which are performed for the sake of the higher individual self or the social self have permanent principles, which are, firstly, universal and same for all individuals and, secondly, are permanent and not temporary.
The other point which has been raised concerns the philosophy of being and the philosophy of becoming. According to the philosophy of being moral values are permanent and therefore ethical principles are eternally true. However, according to the philosophy of becoming moral values are relative and transitory; that is, they are valid during a certain time and invalid in other times.
This is a very important issue, for apart from ethics it touches other judgements as well. According to the philosophy of becoming no truth is permanent. Reality is transient and therefore prescriptions are also transitory, for the difference between truth and morality is that the former is descriptive and the latter is prescriptive, one is theoretical and the other is practical. Inevitably this question also arises in the case of all religious precepts and is not confined to what we mean by the term ethics' (akhlaq). What they (i.e. Westerners) imply by ethics' is a more general sense which includes all prescriptions and the notions of good and evil.
At the outset an objection may be raised here, that the philosophy of becoming does not necessarily imply that truth is changeable. For as we have said the philosophy of becoming relates to external reality, and even if one were to admit that there is nothing except becoming, it does not imply that truth (which is related to the mind) is subject to change. Of course, we accept the implication that should facts, which include human thought, be subject to change, consequently truth as human thought will also be subject to change. But they do not make such an assertion. We believe that truth, which is the content of thought, is inseparable from external and mental existence except in conception.
For example, the statement "Zayd was standing on Friday" is always true. This statement itself, apart from external or mental existence, is not something that may be said to be neither in the mind nor in external reality, a proposition that is eternally true. This proposition has either external existence or mental existence. But when man thinks about it, he first abstracts it from mental existence, and after abstracting its meaning declares it to be eternally true. We believe that if thought itself were changeable, its content will also be changeable, and the statement "Zayd was standing on Friday" will not be conceived today in the mind as it was conceived yesterday. It will change into something else.
This was in relation to the permanence of truth. The same objection can be raised in relation to moral values. Suppose we believe in a philosophy of becoming, and it implies that truth is changeable. But morals and precepts are a set of prescriptions and these are normative in nature. The changeability of truth does not necessitate the changeability of norms. In an article, "Khatm-e Nubuwwat," ("The Ultimacy of the Prophethood"), I have pointed out that if anybody claims that all things are subject to change, then the ultimate prophecy and everlasting laws become meaningless. Our position is that if truth be mutable it does not imply that prescriptions should also be mutable. For prescriptions derive from convention and the law of change of facts does not apply to prescriptions. Thus, it is wrong to assert that a philosophy of becoming will imply mutability of moral values. However, there is another argument that may be offered to support this view.
This other argument is that every prescription, ethical or non-ethical, is based on certain expediencies. This view coincides with the view of the theologians, and jurisprudence following them, who maintain that "religious obligations are subtle instances of rational obligations," or, in the words of Na'ini, certain benefits and harms underlie the causes of religious precepts, which are meant to achieve those benefits and are therefore subordinate to objective benefits and harms, like an effect subordinate to its cause.
The benefits are facts and commands and prohibitions are based on conventions and norms. But the benefits and harms from which the commands and prohibitions stem are not permanent, for they are facts. Thus when the former are not permanent the latter also will not be permanent. The objection to the eternity of moral values takes another form in accordance with this argument.
Now we wish to make a fundamental examination of ethical criteria and confine our discussion to ethics in our own special sense. The question of religious precepts requires a wide-ranging study and has many ramifications pertaining to worship, social and financial issues and other matters.
In the sphere of ethics, one may maintain that moral values are permanent on the basis that moral values are identical with reality, in the sense that a moral act is good because it is essentially attributed with the quality of goodness. The immoral act is bad because it is attributed with the quality of badness. Hence every act is either essentially moral or essentially immoral, although it may be said that there are some acts which are neither essentially moral nor immoral. It means that moral goodness and evil are objective qualities of things inherent in their essences, and that which is essential is not mutable. That
which is morally good is good forever and that which is immoral will always remain immoral. We should do that which is morally good and refrain from that which is immoral, and this is a self-evident and indisputable judgement of reason. This is one of the arguments that may be offered in favour of the permanence of ethical values. Such an argument is based on the essential character of good and evil which are considered as objective attributes.
Muslim philosophers have not discussed this issue but they do not believe in good and evil as being inherent in things. In logic, they consider any reference to morality or immorality as reference to popular convention which finds use only in dialectics and rhetoric. They even point out that morals vary with nations and they cite the example of Indians who consider slaughter of animals as immoral. However they do not elaborate and do not explain why the notions of moral goodness and evil cannot be employed in rational arguments. They do not explain why they are different from mathematical propositions and what criterion underlies this distinction. They only say that morality or immorality pertain to the rules of practical reason. However it is clear that practical reason develops such notions in order to achieve certain goals. In any case they have not elaborated upon this matter.
The Origins of Normative Notions
Among philosophers Allamah Tabataba'i has treated this issue more thoroughly than anyone else. In the sixth chapter of his book Usul-e falsafeh wa ravishe realism, he has discussed profoundly this issue, which is related partly to philosophy in that it explains the process of development of ideas by the mind. However, the greater part of this discussion relates to jurisprudence (ilm al-usul). There he has discussed the origin and character of the development of normative ideas, and this topic deserves to be studied in greater depth and thoroughness. However, here I will give a brief summary of his ideas relating to this discussion.
He begins by asserting that one of the functions of the mind is that it abstracts certain ideas from external objects (an operation that does not involve any innovation) then applies them to another reality, that is, it applies the definition of one thing to another thing. In technical and literary terms, it invents metaphors. A metaphor, especially in accordance with Sakkaki's view, is not simply the use of a word in some other meaning. It does not simply involve applying, for instance the word lion,' after divesting of its meaning, to a person with a similar quality. No. A metaphor involves a change in meaning not a change in word. Actually what we do is that we see, for instance, Zayd as an instance of the meaning of lion,' then we apply the word lion' to him. This is a kind of innovation of the mind. The late Ayatullah Burujerdi would make an interesting remark in this relation. He would say that when we say, "I saw a lion shooting', this statement is actually composed of the two following statements: "I saw Zayd shooting," and "Zayd is like a lion." He agreed with Sakkaki's conception of the metaphor.
Such is Allamah Tabatabai's notion of the mind's capacity to formulate and invent concepts by supposing - not arbitrarily but in accordance with a certain basis - one thing as an instance of another thing.
Another observation that he makes (though I do not agree with its generalization) is that the difference between animals on one hand and plants and inanimate things on the other is that the latter move towards their end in one predetermined direction alone. Nature, in the course of its normal movement, is equipped with means through which it moves inexorably towards its goal. Animals also, in respect of their physical and natural being (not as beings possessing cognition and mind), like plants move directly towards their end in the natural world. But in their case, in most of their activities, the means of nature do not suffice to direct animals towards their goals. That is why they employ their mental and cognitive faculties to achieve their ends and in fact there emerges a kind of harmony between physical nature (which is unconscious) and the mind which functions in a manner enabling nature to achieve its ends. The mind is however directed to achieving a series of ends which are supposed to be different from the ends of nature and one imagines that the harmony between the two is accidental.
The cognitive nature of man and animal is such that when they perceive and conceive an object there arises a desire and appetite for it as [an expectation of] pleasure in attaining it and of pain in the failure to attain it. This is followed by the motive to obtain the pleasure or to avoid the pain. For instance, man feels hunger and with his past experience of the pleasure in eating food he seeks food in order to obtain that pleasure. But at the same time in the process of this act nature too attains its end, for the body needs food in order to replace the materials it has consumed. Eating serves both the ends, the conscious purpose of pleasure is attained and at the same time nature also satisfies its need. Hence, the question arises: Are these two acts unconnected with each other and is their coincidence something accidental? Is it possible for the case to be otherwise, that is, a person might feel pleasure in eating stones while his stomach requires some other food? Is it an accident that delicious foods which bring pleasure to one who eats also helps satisfy the nature's needs? Or is it the case that there is no accident involved here and there exists a kind of harmony between the two, where one is primary and the other is secondary? In case there is no accident involved here, is the conscious desire to obtain pleasure and to avoid pain the primary principle which requires an apparatus that may cooperate with it for the end of pleasure by digesting food and absorbing nourishing substances? Or is the case quite the inverse and it is nature which constitutes the primary principle, having subjugated the conscious mind to its service. Undoubtedly, there is some kind of harmony between the natural and conscious ends. Hence every animal takes pleasure in what nature needs and nature also needs that which brings pleasure. For instance, a woman is equipped with organs and glands required for child bearing and nursing and she finds pleasure in these acts. The animal that lays eggs takes pleasure in that act, and an animal that gives birth takes pleasure in that act as well. There exists a strong harmony between them.
It is wrong to think that purposive movement is confined to conscious beings only. When it is said that nature has certain ends, some people may raise doubts as to whether unconscious nature may have ends. In fact ends are related to that very unconscious nature and the conscious mind has ends which are incidental to the ends of nature. The end of nature is to move towards its perfection. As remarked by Ibn Sina, the possession of consciousness does not make purposive a being that lacks purpose. Purposiveness is related to the essence of a thing. Sometimes a thing is aware of its end and sometimes it is not.
Q: There is not always a harmony between pleasure and natural need. Many pleasures are harmful for nature and injurious to its perfection.
A: Deviant cases are not to be taken into consideration, particularly in the case of human being who act according to reason. What I mean is that there is a general harmony that exists to such an extent that it cannot be accidental. Exceptional cases, like that of the sick person who needs medicine without feeling any pleasure in taking it, arise out of a kind of difference between two exigencies, a topic which has its own details. An animal takes pleasure in eating its medicine because it acts according to instinct, while the human being, who acts according to his reason, does not take pleasure in it.
Allamah Tabataba'i says that the world of normative concepts begins here. The way he explains the issue it appears as if all animate beings including man and animals possess such ideas. But I do not agree with this generalization. According to him there is a necessary relation between nature and ends, like the concrete, objective and philosophical relation between cause and effect. Now in the world of conception man takes the objective relation of necessity - as opposed to the relation of contingency - between two things in nature and applies that relation to two things between which there is no such real relation. For example, he applies the term lion' to a brave man. Here, too, man applies the term necessity' as found in external nature to the relation between himself and his goal. Such necessities and oughts created by the mind, arise out of such conceptions. The Allamah is of the view that such oughts exist in every voluntary act and in every conscious animal.
The earlier Muslim philosophers did not believe in such an ought or imperative. They only held that man first conceives the benefit in something, then there arises a desire for it, followed by a resolution. They described its various stages stating that first there is conception followed by a judgement of the benefit. This judgment in their view posits something objective, that is, a certain object has a certain benefit. The final stage is the stage of volition. However, they did not believe that a normative judgement was involved here.
But Allamah Tabataba'i holds that such a conception and imperative is involved here and the statement that something is good has no other meaning. When we say that it is good to do something, its goodness' arises from here. There is another issue involved here as to whether good' arises out of ought' or the case is the reverse. As the Allamah holds that ought' is the first formulation (i'tibar), he holds that good' arises from it. "It is good to do so" signifies a kind of inclination towards something and it is as if one were attributing objective and concrete qualities to human actions.